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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Eugene Victorovich Agafonov appeals from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction and Order Retaining Jurisdiction. Mr. Agafonov asserts that the district court
erred in allowing the State to question State's witness, Oleg Goyenko, about whether he
told police that Mr. Agafonov had previously told Mr. Goyenko that Mr. Agafonov used
opiates and that he injected opiates with a syringe. He asserts that the testimony was
not proper impeachment or rehabilitation of Mr. Goyenko, it was not relevant evidence,
the prejudicial effect outweighed any potential probative value, it was not admissible
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 106, and it was not admissible as out of order
rebuttal to impeach Mr. Agafonov prior to his testimony.

In fact, this evidence was

inappropriate, prior bad act, hearsay evidence, which the State sought to introduce
under the guise of needing to impeach their own witness or present a complete version
of the contents of a police report.

The district court erred in allowing this line of

questioning.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 19, 2010, an Information was filed charging Mr. Agafonov with
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.3637.) Mr. Agafonov entered not guilty pleas and the case was scheduled for trial. (R.,
pp.53-54.)
The State filed a Notice of State's Intent to Introduce Evidence Under I.R.E.
404(b) seeking admittance of the testimony of "Oleg Goyenko that he was aware that
Eugene used opiates because the Defendant told him that he used opiates in the past,
1

and that the Defendant injects the opiates with a syringe." (R., pp.68-69.) The State
asserted the evidence would be used to prove "that it was the Defendant who
possessed the heroin and the alleged drug paraphernalia in this case." (R., pp.68-69.)
At a pretrial conference, the district court held that it would determine the admissibility of
the evidence at the appropriate time during trial.

(Tr.2/24/11, p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.6.)

Immediately prior to the start of trial, the district court ruled that the evidence could be
used as impeachment if issues of "intent or similar arguments were raised by the
defense," that sufficient evidence was presented to show the conversation occurred,
and that the "probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice." (Tr., p.4, Ls.1324.)
The case then proceeded to trial.

(R., pp.86-100.)

The State presented the

testimony of Officer Derek Savage. (Tr., p.137, Ls.6-9.) Officer Savage responded to a
home, Mr. Agafonov's brother met him outside, took him into the home, and Officer
Savage found a man lying on the floor in a upstairs bathroom. (Tr., p.139, L.17 - p.140,
L.21.) The man, Eugene, was not responsive, breathing slowly and had a rapid pulse.
(Tr., p.141, L.11 - p.142, L.13.) In an attempt to discover what Mr. Agafonov had taken,
Officer Savage began looking around the bathroom and found, bloody Q-tips, a syringe
cap, two syringes (one with liquid, one empty) in a drawer, an Altoids container, a razor
blade, and two metal spoons with burn residue. (Tr., p.145, L.22 - p.146, L.20.) Officer
Savage then instructed Deputy Meyer to talk to Oleg Goyenko and find out what
Mr. Agafonov had taken; it was reported back that he had taken opium.

(Tr., p.156,

Ls.16-24.) After the paramedics administered a narcotic blocker, Mr. Agafonov awoke,
and was transported by ambulance.

(Tr., p.157, Ls.1-18.)
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Officer Savage then

collected the syringes and spoons to send to the State Lab for testing. (Tr., p.157, L.19
- p.159, L.22.)
Next, Paramedic Kevin Luby testified that he responded to the call; observed
Mr. Agafonov was unconscious and unresponsive; administered narcan, a narcotic
inhibitor; shortly thereafter Mr. Agafonov woke up and was responsive; and he then
transported Mr. Agafonov to the hospital. (Tr., p.190, L.14 - p.200, L.23.) Ms. Corinna
Owsley, a forensic scientist, testified that the substance in the syringe was heroin. (Tr.,
p.219, L.9- p.227, L.14.)
The State then called Oleg Goyenko. (Tr., p.239, Ls.2-3.) Mr. Goyenko was an
acquaintance of Mr. Agafonov's.

(Tr., p.240, L.24 - p.241, L.1.)

He met up with

IVlr. Agafonov at a gas station and ended up driving Mr. Agafonov and his car back to
Mr. Agafonov's home. (Tr., p.242, L.1 - p.243, L.12.) Mr. Goyenko testified that he and
Mr. Agafonov went up to Mr. Agafonov's room, hung out listening to music,
Mr. Goyenko left the room to make a phone call, and when he returned to the room
Mr. Agafonov was on the floor. (Tr., p.243, L.21 - p.244, L.22.) On cross-examination,
Mr. Goyenko testified that he was an active drug user at the time and has injected drugs
several times.

(Tr., p.256, Ls.11-25.)

Defense counsel then asked Mr. Goyenko

several questions about the conversations he had with police during the incident. (Tr.,
p.257, L.5 - p.274, L.5.)

When Mr. Goyenko's testimony about the conversations did

not match Deputy Meyer's police report, defense counsel provided it to the witness, and
then questioned him about the differences between the report and what Mr. Goyenko
testified he said on that day. (Tr., p.262, L.9 - p.274, L.5.) Mr. Goyenko reviewed the
entire report and noticed three things that he believed were not accurate: that he did
not go to Mr. Agafonov's house to smoke cigarettes, that he did not say he had just
3

returned from Portland, and that Mr. Agafonov had given him $100 because he was
short on cash. (Tr., p.265, L.12 - p.266, L.25.)
Prior to re-direct, the State asked for a hearing outside the presence of the jury.
(Tr., p.276, Ls.1-7.) The State then presented that defense counsel had asked several
questions to Mr. Goyenko about a police report and its contents. (Tr., p.276, Ls.17-23.)
The report also contained the statements that were the focus of the 404(b) notice filed
pretrial.

(Tr., p.277, Ls.1-3.) The State represented that it had talked with defense

counsel and was not going to present the evidence because Mr. Goyenko would not
commit to affirming those statements.

(Tr., p.277, Ls.8-23.)

As a result of defense

counsel asking questions about the police report and questioning Mr. Goyenko directly
about making some statements, the State asserted that it would like to be able to
question Mr. Goyenko about statements allegedly made by Mr. Agafonov regarding his
prior drug use, and "either have him admit or deny that here in court in front of the jury."
(Tr., p.277, L.24 - p.278, L.7.)
Defense counsel responded that the State was attempting to impeach their own
witness; that there was no foundation for the 404(b) because Mr. Goyenko had testified
that large portions of the report were fabricated; that because the source is not reliable
the information is more prejudicial than probative; and finally the defense requested a
limiting instruction be given if the evidence was allowed in. (Tr., p.278, L.9 - p.279,
L.22.) The State argued that it was only fair to present the contents of the report in its
entirety; that Mr. Goyenko had not yet had an opportunity to admit or deny making the
statements about Mr. Agafonov; that it would be misleading to the jury for them to not
hear testimony about other things he was alleged to have said; and that "in fairness [the
jury] should be made aware of this and use it for the purposes of determining
4

Mr. Goyenko's credibility." (Tr., p.280, L.1 - p.281, L.15.) Defense counsel stated that
it was only using the report to impeach Mr. Goyenko because the version of events he
presented on direct was in opposition to the report that had been disclosed and that the
use of the report was pure impeachment. (Tr., p.281, L.17 - p.282, L.16.)
The district court then held that:
Well, first of all, the State, any party, can impeach any witness on the
basis of prior inconsistent statements. Any party can, in effect, rehabilitate
that witness by the utilization of prior consistent statements, if they in fact
exist.
The Court has already ruled that 404(b) evidence, which the State
indicated that it would introduce, would be admissible for the purpose of
impeachment.
At this point, however, the Court does believe that the defense has
opened the door with regard to the nature of the statements in this police
report, and the fact that they appear to be inconsistent with the testimony
made by the defendant (sic).
It also seems reasonable to me, this Court does have the authority
to make decisions related to the order of the evidence, and it seems to this
Court that the logical portion in this trial to allow the State to ask these
questions would be now, when the witness is here, when Mr. Loschi has
attacked the witness, certainly pretty effectively, with regard to accuracy of
the witness' testimony as compared to the report; just simply allow the
State to do the same with regard to evidence that otherwise would have
been presented in rebuttal in any event, just for the purposes of not
confusing the jury.
Is the evidence that the State intends to admit with regard to the
defendant's (sic) prior statements more probative than prejudicial?
And the Court has already ruled that there is sufficient evidence
that the statements were made based upon the representations of what
supposedly was said to the police that evening.
I think at this point, Mr. Loschi, I'm going to allow the State to
pursue that with regard to the examination of this witness, with regard to
the inconsistent statements that affect the State's case.
I think the Doctrine of Completeness with regard to prior
statements, which is the remainder or - or the remainder of or related
writing, recordings or statements under Rule 106, certainly the philosophy
5

behind that rule is that you don't use one part of the report to examine,
and the Court then tell the other side that they can't raise the other issues
that might be contained in that written instrument. And that's why that rule
is there.
And I think in this case that is the philosophy behind the Rules of
Evidence. This is supposed to be a search for the truth. And so I'm going
to allow the State to cross-examine the witness - or examine the witness
further with regard to this issue, because I think the door has been opened
with regard to the credibility of anything the witness has - the witness
might say, as opposed to the police reports at that time and what they say
he stated.
And further, I will give an instruction, which is contained here, that
there is evidence that on some former occasion a witness made a
statement while he or she was not under oath, that is inconsistent with his
or her testimony at trial, and that may be considered by the jury only for
the purpose of testing the believability of the testimony that the witness
gave during trial.
The State has the right to impeach its own witness. It appears to
me that you're both going to impeach this witness, and I guess that's what
the jury is going to decide, is whether or not to believe anything that this
witness has to say.
(Tr., p.282, L.17 - p.285, L.17.) The State then asked to clarify the record that they
were not offering the evidence for 404(b) purposes. (Tr., p.285, Ls.20-25.) The district
court then followed up with the following:
Well, I'm going to find that it's appropriate impeachment. All I was pointing
out was that I had already made a determination that this evidence with
regard to what may have been said was relevant evidence, and that it was
more probative than prejudicial under the 403 test.
I don't think I can then make a finding now that it is not equally
admissibility [sic] for purposes of impeachment.
(Tr., p.286, Ls.4-13.)
Mr. Goyenko then testified that he had told Deputy Meyer that he was aware

Mr. Agafonov used opiates and had injected them with a syringe because Mr. Agafonov
had told him that previously. (Tr., p.296, L.4 - p.297, L.24.) The district court then gave
a limiting instruction. (Tr., p.299, Ls.1-23.)
6

The State then presented the testimony of some of Mr. Agafonov's relatives that
were home on the night in question: Roman Agafonov and Nataliya Agafonov.

(Tr.,

p.307, L.19 - p.346, L.2.) The State then rested. (Tr., p.347, Ls.2-3.)
The defense presented the testimony of Mr. Agafonov. He testified that on the
night in question he took several Vicodin and Percocets after drinking a large amount of
alcohol. (Tr., p.360, Ls.21-25, p.364, Ls.12-19.) Mr. Agafonov admitted he had a bad
habit of taking prescription drugs, but was adamant that he was not using heroin and
had never used heroin.

(Tr., p.365, L.20 - p.366, L.15.)

Following Mr. Agafonov's

testimony the defense rested. (Tr., p.404, Ls.16-17.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict for both charges. (R., p.150.) Later, the district
court sentenced Mr. Agafonov to a unified sentence of seven years, with three and a
half years fixed, for the possession of a controlled substance charge, and time served
on the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, retaining jurisdiction for up to one year.
(R., pp.153-155.) Mr. Agafonov filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's

Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining Jurisdiction. (R., pp.159-160.) Following
the successful completion of the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Agafonov was
placed on probation for a five year term. (R., pp.169-173.)

7

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the portion of Mr. Goyenko's
testimony regarding whether or not Mr. Goyenko made statements to an officer,
included in a police report, that Mr. Agafonov had previously told Mr. Goyenko about
Mr. Agafonov's prior use of opiates?

8

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Portion Of Mr. Goyenko's
Testimony Regarding Whether Or Not Mr. Goyenko Made Statements To An Officer,
Included In A Police Report, That Mr. Agafonov Had Previously Told Mr. Goyenko
About Mr. Agafonov's Prior Use Of Opiates

A.

Introduction
Mr. Agafonov asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed

the State to present the testimony of Mr. Goyenko that he had told Officer Meyer that
Mr. Agafonov had told him that Mr. Agafonov had previously injected opiates.
Mr. Agafonov asserts that this evidence was actually inadmissible prior bad act
evidence that was admitted for other improper purposes. The evidence is not relevant
and is overly prejudicial.

Furtl1er, it is not admissible as impeachment, rehabilitation,

under Idaho Rule of Evidence 106, or as out of order rebuttal.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of

discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
564 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112 (2005)).

This Court must

examine whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an
exercise of reason. Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119
Idaho 87, 94 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).
determinations of relevancy are reviewed de nova.
218 (Ct. App. 2009).
9

However,

State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Portion Of
Mr. Goyenko's Testimony Regarding Whether Or Not Mr. Goyenko Made
Statements To An Officer, Included In A Police Report, That Mr. Agafonov Had
Previously Told Mr. Goyenko About Mr. Agafonov's Prior Use Of Opiates
Prior to trial, the State filed a Notice of State's Intent to Introduce Evidence Under

I.R.

404(b) seeking admittance of the testimony of "Oleg Goyenko that he was aware

that Eugene used opiates because the Defendant told him that he used opiates in the
past, and that the Defendant injects the opiates with a syringe." (R., pp.68-69.) The
State asserted the evidence would be used to prove "that it was the Defendant who
possessed the heroin and the alleged drug paraphernalia in this case." (R., pp.68-69.)
Immediately prior to the start of trial, the district court ruled that the evidence could be
used as impeachment if issues of "intent or similar arguments were raised by the
defense," that sufficient evidence was presented to show the conversation occurred,
and that the "probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice." (Tr., p.4, Ls.1324.)

The State called Oleg Goyenko.

(Tr., p.239, Ls.2-3.)

On cross-examination,

defense counsel asked Mr. Goyenko several questions about the conversations he had
with police during the incident.

(Tr., p.257, L.5 - p.274, L.5.)

When Mr. Goyenko's

testimony about the conversations did not match Deputy Meyer's police report, defense
counsel provided it to the witness, and then questioned him about the differences
between the report and what Mr. Goyenko testified he said on that day. (Tr., p.262, L.9
- p.274, L.5.) Mr. Goyenko reviewed the entire report and noticed three things that he
believed were not accurate:

that he did not go to Mr. Agafonov's house to smoke

cigarettes, that he did not say he had just returned from Portland, and that Mr. Agafonov
had given him $100 because he was short on cash. (Tr., p.265, L.12- p.266, L.25.)
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Prior to re-direct, the State asked for a hearing outside the presence of the jury.
(Tr., p.276, Ls.1-7.) The State then presented that defense counsel had asked several
questions to Mr. Goyenko about a police report and its contents. (Tr., p.276, Ls.17-23.)
The report also contained the statements that were the focus of the 404(b) notice filed
pretrial.

(Tr., p.277, Ls.1-3.) The State represented that it had talked with defense

counsel and was not going to present the evidence because Mr. Goyenko would not
commit to affirming those statements.

(Tr., p.277, Ls.8-23.)

As a result of defense

counsel asking questions about the police report and questioning Mr. Goyenko directly
about making some statements, the State asserted that it would like to be able to
question Mr. Goyenko about statements allegedly made by Mr. Agafonov regarding his
prior drug use, and "either have him admit or deny that here in court in front of the jury."
(Tr., p.277, L.24 - p.278, L.7.)
Defense counsel responded that the State was attempting to impeach their own
witness; that there was no foundation for the 404(b) because Mr. Goyenko had testified
that large portions of the report were fabricated; that because the source is not reliable
the information is more prejudicial than probative; and finally requested a limiting
instruction be given if the evidence was allowed in. (Tr., p.278, L.9 - p.279, L.22.) The
State argued that it was only fair to present the contents of the report in its entirety; that
Mr. Goyenko had not yet had an opportunity to admit or deny making the statements
about Mr. Agafonov; that it would be misleading to the jury for them to not hear
testimony about other things he was alleged to have said; and that "in fairness [the jury]
should be made aware of this and use it for the purposes of determining Mr. Goyenko's
credibility."

(Tr., p.280, L.1 - p.281, L.15.)

Defense counsel stated that it was only

using the report to impeach Mr. Goyenko because the version of events he presented
11

on direct was in opposition to the report that had been disclosed and that the use of the
report was pure impeachment. (Tr., p.281, L.17 - p.282, L.16.)
The district court then held that the evidence was admissible as impeachment,
under the doctrine of completeness, and as out of order evidence that would have been
permitted at a later point anyway. (Tr., p.282, L.17 - p.285, L.17.) The State asked to
clarify the record that they were not offering the evidence for 404(b) purposes.

(Tr.,

p.285, Ls.20-25.)
Mr. Goyenko then testified that he had told Deputy Meyer that he was aware
Mr. Agafonov used opiates and had injected them with a syringe because Mr. Agafonov
had told him that previously. (Tr., p.296, L.4 - p.297, L.24.)

1. The Evidence Is Improper 404(b) Evidence
Despite the State's attempt to argue that the evidence was not offered for 404(b)
purposes, in fact, this evidence was inappropriate, prior bad act, hearsay evidence,
which the State sought to introduce under the guise of needing to impeach their own
witness or to present a complete version of the contents of a police report.

The

evidence provided that Mr. Agafonov had allegedly injected heroin previously and falls
squarely under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b).
Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to show a defendant's criminal propensity.
667 (2010).

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,

"It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident," if the prosecution has provided notice that it intends to produce the
evidence. Id.; I.R.E. 404(b). Relevancy is an issue of law and is freely reviewed by the
appellate court. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 501 (1999).
12

Yet, under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." State v. Page, 135 Idaho
214, 219 (2000).

This Court reviews a trial court's decision regarding evidence's

prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009)

(citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 5648 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho
110,112 (2005)).
As such, the appellate court employs a two-step analysis, determining: (1)
whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an issue
other than the defendant's character or criminal propensity; and (2) whether, under
I.RE. 403, the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant.

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667 (citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670

(1999)). However, "evidence of a person's actions or conduct, other than that set forth
as an ultimate issue for trial, is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b)." State v.
Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 119 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho
948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990)).
In the case at hand, evidence that Mr. Agafonov had allegedly told Mr. Goyenko
that he had previously used and injected opiates, was either not relevant or overly
prejudicial and should have been excluded.

a. The Evidence Is Not Relevant
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
I.RE. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible; conversely, irrelevant evidence
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is inadmissible. I.RE. 402. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that is
freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008).
Evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor.

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (citation

omitted.). In order to make this determination, "the trial court must determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." Id. (citations
omitted.) "The trial court must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is
relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than
propensity." Id. (citations omitted.)

i.

Offer Of Proof

Grist requires, "[f]irst, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient

evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.

Pretrial, the district court determined that sufficient evidence was presented to show the
conversation occurred. (Tr., p.4, Ls.13-24.) However, the district court erred in failing
to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the other crimes or
wrongs as fact, in effect, whether Mr. Agafonov had injected opiates in the past.
The evidence was not sufficient to establish this as a fact. The information is
presented is hearsay. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." I.RE. 801. The offered evidence was that Mr. Agafonov allegedly
told Mr. Goyenko, who then told Deputy Meyer, that Mr. Agafonov had injected opium in
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the past. Although Mr. Agafonov's statements are admissible, Mr. Goyenko's are not. 1
I.R. E. 801 and 802.

Hearsay statements are normally inadmissible because of

concerns regarding their reliability and trustworthiness.

Based on the fact that this

information was hearsay, it was error for the district court to find that it was sufficient to
prove as a fact that Mr. Agafonov had injected opiates.
Additionally, Mr. Goyenko had reasons to lie to police. He was on probation at
the time, was a known drug user, and could have also been charged with possessing
the heroin or drug paraphernalia. Although the district court may have cause to believe
the officer that the conversation between Detective Meyer and Mr. Goyenko occurred,
there was no information presented to prove that the conversation between
IVlr. Goyenko and Mr. Agafonov occurred.
As such, the 404(b) evidence should not have been admitted because the other
crime had not been established as fact.

ii.

Relevance For A Non-Propensity Purpose

"Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E.
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate
the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.

Evidence of uncharged bad acts is admissible if relevant to a material issue such as
motive, intent, mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, and identity.

State v.

Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 155 (Ct. App. 1986); See also I.R.E. 404(b).

1

Additionally, Mr. Agafonov asserts that the evidence is inadmissible solely because it
is hearsay. There is not a specific hearsay exception for 404(b) evidence and the
articulated hearsay exceptions do not apply to the facts of this case. I.R.E. 803.
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In the case at hand, the facts of consequence were those facts related to the
potential commission of the crimes charged in the information.

Whether or not

Mr. Goyenko told anything to Deputy Meyer does not enlighten the jury as to
Mr. Agafonov's guilt or innocence of the charges. As such, it is not relevant for this
purpose.
Assuming that the information was offered to show that Mr. Agafonov had
injected opiates previously, the evidence is mere propensity evidence. At the time of
the admission of the evidence, it was not relevant for any of the articulated 404(b)
purposes. At that time, information provided to the jury that Mr. Agafonov had allegedly
told Mr. Goyenko that he had injected opiate in the past did not provide any information
to rebut a presented defense, but was used for the sole purpose of informing the jury
that he had allegedly committed the same acts previously.

As such, the 404(b)

evidence involving prior uncharged acts should not have been admitted as it was not
relevant for a non-propensity purpose.
b.

Assuming Arguendo That The Testimonial Evidence Was Relevant.
The Evidence Was Not Admissible Because The Evidence Was
More Prejudicial Than Probative

Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect
outweighs any limited probative value.

I.RE. 403 states that "Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice ... " I.RE. 403.
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993). I.RE. 403 creates a balancing test. On one

hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered evidence by
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focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107
(1987).

At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the

evidence amounts to unfair prejudice. Id.
To some extent all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho
83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).

The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it

harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict
regardless of other facts presented. Id. It is a fundamental tenet of the American legal
system that a defendant may only be convicted based upon proof that he committed the
crime with which he is charged, and not based upon poor character.
126 Idaho 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Wood,

Evidence of misconduct not charged in an

underlying offense may have an unjust influence on the jurors and may lead them to
determine guilt based upon either: (1) a presumption that if the defendant did it before,
he must have done it this time; or (2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether
the defendant committed the charged crime because he deserves to be punished
anyhow for other bad acts. Id. at 244-45. "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence]
is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the
crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52

(quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)).
In the case at hand, the testimonial evidence provided through Mr. Goyenko was
unfairly prejudicial. Information that Mr. Agafonov may have told 1\/lr. Goyenko that he
injected opiates in the past carries very little weight to show that on the date in question
he possessed and injected heroin.

On the other hand, this evidence was highly

prejudicial. The evidence could easily lead the jury to believe that Mr. Agafonov had a
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recent history of this type of drug use.

In effect, leading the jury to convict

Mr. Agafonov, not on the relevant evidence presented, but based upon his disposition to
commit crimes, i.e. prior use and injection of opiates like heroin. There is a significant
stigma attached to drug use, especially injecting heroin, and it is highly prejudicial to
allow the jury to have this type of information in their minds while determining guilt or
innocence. This is especially true in light of the more limited probative value created by
the hearsay nature of the evidence. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in
finding that the unfair prejudice did not outweigh any probative value of the evidence.

2. The Evidence Is Not Admissible As Impeachment Of Mr. Goyenko,
Rehabilitation Of Mr. Goyenko, Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 106, Or As
Rebuttal Of Mr. Agafonov's Presumed Future Testimony
The district court held that the evidence was admissible for a variety of reasons:
Well, first of all, the State, any party, can impeach any witness on the
basis of prior inconsistent statements. Any party can, in effect, rehabilitate
that witness by the utilization of prior consistent statements, if they in fact
exist.
The Court has already ruled that 404(b) evidence, which the State
indicated that it would introduce, would be admissible for the purpose of
impeachment.
At this point, however, the Court does believe that the defense has
opened the door with regard to the nature of the statements in this police
report, and the fact that they appear to be inconsistent with the testimony
made by the defendant (sic).
It also seems reasonable to me, this Court does have the authority
to make decisions related to the order of the evidence, and it seems to this
Court that the logical portion in this trial to allow the State to ask these
questions would be now, when the witness is here, when Mr. Loschi has
attacked the witness, certainly pretty effectively, with regard to accuracy of
the witness' testimony as compared to the report; just simply allow the
State to do the same with regard to evidence that otherwise would have
been presented in rebuttal in any event, just for the purposes of not
confusing the jury.
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Is the evidence that the State intends to admit with regard to the
defendant's (sic) prior statements more probative than prejudicial?
And the Court has already ruled that there is sufficient evidence
that the statements were made based upon the representations of what
supposedly was said to the police that evening.
I think at this point, Mr. Loschi, I'm going to allow the State to
pursue that with regard to the examination of this witness, with regard to
the inconsistent statements that affect the State's case.
I think the Doctrine of Completeness with regard to prior
statements, which is the remainder or - or the remainder of or related
writing, recordings or statements under Rule 106, certainly the philosophy
behind that rule is that you don't use one part of the report to examine,
and the Court then tell the other side that they can't raise the other issues
that might be contained in that written instrument. And that's why that rule
is there.
And I think in this case that is the philosophy behind the Rules of
Evidence. This is supposed to be a search for the truth. And so I'm going
to allow the State to cross-examine the witness - or examine the witness
further with regard to this issue, because I think the door has been opened
with regard to the credibility of anything the witness has - the witness
might say, as opposed to the police reports at that time and what they say
he stated.
And further, I will give an instruction, which is contained here, that
there is evidence that on some former occasion a witness made a
statement while he or she was not under oath, that is inconsistent with his
or her testimony at trial, and that may be considered by the jury only for
the purpose of testing the believability of the testimony that the witness
gave during trial.
The State has the right to impeach its own witness. It appears to
me that you're both going to impeach this witness, and I guess that's what
the jury is going to decide, is whether or not to believe anything that this
witness has to say.
(Tr., p.282, L.17 - p.285, L.17.)

However, the district court abused its discretion in

allowing the admission of l'v'lr. Goyenko's testimony that he told Deputy Meyer that
Mr. Agafonov had told him that he injected opiates in the past as it is not admissible for
any of the reasons articulated by the district court and is, instead, improperly admitted
prior bad act evidence as discussed above.
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a. The Evidence Is Not Admissible To Impeach Mr. Goyenko
Any party has the right to attack the credibility of a witness. I.R.E. 607. "Under
I.R. E. 613, inconsistent out of court statements may be used to impeach a witness' trial
testimony."

State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 248 (Ct. App. 1994).

The evidence,

however, must be relevant for admission. Id. at 249.
The State wanted to ask Mr. Goyenko if he had told Detective Meyer that
Mr. Agafonov had told him that he had injected opiates previously. Evidence regarding
conversations between Mr. Goyenko and Deputy Meyer is not relevant to the ultimate
question at trial. Additional questioning about what Mr. Goyenko believed he said to
Deputy Meyer does not aid in the jury's credibility determination as the jury has already
been made aware that Mr. Goyenko now asserts that he did not say everything he was
alleged to have said by Deputy Meyer.
Further, the State had no reason to believe that Mr. Goyenko would not affirm the
statements.

He had been given a copy of the police report and after reviewing the

entire report, stated that he noticed three things that he believed were not accurate:
that he did not go to Mr. Agafonov's house to smoke cigarettes, that he did not say he
had just returned from Portland, and that Mr. Agafonov had given him $100 because he
was short on cash.

(Tr., p.265, L.12 - p.266, L.25.) This statement shows that he

believed the rest of the report was accurate.

Questions reaffirming the report would

work to rehabilitate Mr. Goyenko, not to impeach him.
In sum, the State's proposed questioning is not relevant and does not accomplish
the goals of impeachment. Instead, the State is asserting that it should be allowed to
impeach its own witness to bootstrap in inadmissible prior bad act evidence. Since the
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line of questioning was not relevant as permissible impeachment, it should have been
excluded under Idaho Rules of Evidence 404 and 802.

b. The Evidence Is Not Admissible To Rehabilitate Mr. Goyenko
Prior consistent statements used to rehabilitate a witness's testimony are not
hearsay pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(8) states the
following:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is ... (B) consistent with declarant's testimony and is offered
to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive ....
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(8).

Prior consistent statements may be offered to show that the

witness did not recently fabricate testimony. Id. Such statements are not hearsay
because they are not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
declaration, but to show the credibility of the witness. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727,
732 (2001).
In the case at hand, the evidence was not proper rehabilitation because there
was no express or implied charge that Mr. Goyenko's testimony was a recent fabrication
or subject to improper influence or motive.

As such, the testimony fails to meet a

requisite for admission.
Further, prior consistent statements can only apply to topics that had been
discussed in testimony.

Defense counsel only elicited testimony that three things in

Deputy Meyer's report were inaccurate: that he did not go to Mr. Agafonov's house to
smoke cigarettes, that he did not say he had just returned from Portland, and that
Mr. Agafonov had given him $100 because he was short on cash. (Tr., p.265, L.12 21

p.266, L.25.) Had the State wanted to question Mr. Goyenko about other instances that
he discussed these limited areas, that may have been proper rehabilitation. However,
impeaching a witness in one area does not open the door to any statement that witness
may have said previously that they will now affirm, even though such statements had
not been discussed on direct or cross-examination.

Therefore, the evidence is not

admissible as rehabilitation.

c. The Evidence Is Not Admissible Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 106
Idaho Rule of Evidence 106 states that:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a
party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to
be considered contemporaneously with it.

I.R. E. 106. Only those sections of the statement which are relevant are admissible
under I.R.E. 106. State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 86 (1989).
In Fain, the defendant sought admission of the entire transcript of a police
interview after an officer testified as to various statements the defendant made during
that interview. Fain, 116 Idaho at 86. The trial court refused to admit the transcript. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "[t]he State did not introduce the transcript, but
[the officer] simply related his recollection of part of the conversation." Id. "Fain
requested that the entire transcript be admitted into evidence; he did not limit his
request to those portions of the transcript which explained, qualified or were relevant to
that part of the conversation regarding which [the officer] testified." Id. The Court held
that while limited relevant portions would have been admissible under I.R.E. 106, Fain's
counsel failed to tailor his request "so as to move for the admission of only those other
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parts of his statement which might be relevant in the context of [the officer's] testimony."
Id.

The State sought to elicit testimony about additional sections of the police report
or conversation between Mr. Goyenko and Deputy Meyer. This testimony did not offer
an explanation of the admitted portions, place the admitted portions in context, help to
avoid misleading the jury as to what was discussed that evening, or insure a fair and
impartial understanding of the conversation.

This is not an instance were defense

counsel elicited limited testimony from a witness and left important, clarifying sections of
the testimony out in order to give the testimony a different meaning than it actually had.
As such, it was not relevant in the context of what had already been elicited and should
not have been admitted.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 106, much like its federal counterpart, is designed to
ensure fairness, not as a loop hole to allow in otherwise inadmissible evidence. United
States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that "Rule 106, the
rule of completeness," does not "empower[ ] a court to admit unrelated hearsay in the
interest of fairness and completeness when that hearsay does not come within a
defined hearsay exception"); United States v. Awon, 135 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir.1998)
(finding that rule 106 does not come into play when "a few inconsistencies between outof-court and in-court statements are revealed through cross-examination; rather, it
operates to ensure fairness where a misunderstanding or distortion created by the other
party can only be averted by the introduction of the full text of the out-of-court
statement."); United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir.) (holding that the rule
of completeness permits nothing more than setting the context and clarifying the
answers given on cross-examination; it is not proper to admit "all prior consistent
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statements simply to bolster the credibility of a witness who has been impeached by
particulars.").
In the case at hand, defense counsel did not offer a misleading snippet of
Mr. Goyenko's testimony. Rather, by offering direct questions about the conversation
between Mr. Goyenko and Deputy Meyer, Mr. Agafonov merely cast doubt on
Mr. Goyenko's accuracy and reliability as a witness. As such, in contravention of I.R.E.
106, the complete statement did not serve to correct a misleading impression of a prior
statement created by taking Mr. Goyenko's comments out of context.
I.R.E. 106 does not require that the State be allowed to introduce evidence
regarding the alleged conversation between Mr. Agafonov and Mr. Goyenko reported to
Deputy Meyer, in the interest of fairness. The evidence the State sought to introduce
was not admissible as it was neither relevant nor necessary in the interests of fairness.
As such, the district court abused its discretion in allowing the admittance of the
evidence under I.R.E. 106.

d.

The Evidence Is Not Admissible As
Mr. Agafonov's Presumed Future Testimony

Impeachment

Of

"Rebuttal evidence is evidence which explains, repels, counteracts or disproves
evidence which has been introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party." State v.

Olsen, 103 Idaho 278,281 (1982), State v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341 (1964); State v. Mundell,
66 Idaho 339 (1945); State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180 (1926).

At the point that

Mr. Goyenko had testified, Mr. Agafonov had not offered any testimony. Therefore, the
evidence was not proper rebuttal because, at that point in time, there was no evidence
to rebut. While the district court does have control over the order of testimony as it
suggested, that authority has limitations.
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Defense counsel did not promise that

Mr. Agafonov would be testifying nor was any information regarding what any testimony
would be should he testify. It was premature to allow Mr. Goyenko's testimony in this
specific area, assuming that it would be relevant at a later time, as it would be
imposslble to determine if such evidence would in fact become relevant and admissible.
As such, it was an abuse of discretion to allow the testimony in for this purpose.
3. The Admittance Of The Evidence Was Not Harmless Error
The United States Supreme Court has described the harmless error doctrine as
follows:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand... But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous actlon from
the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it
is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result,
apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether
the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (citation omitted). Harmless error

is defined in Rule 52 of the Idaho Criminal Rules as, "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The harmless
error doctrine has been further defined by thls Court: "To hold an error as harmless, an
appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,

24 (1967)).
Mr. Agafonov contends that this error was not harmless. Because there was a
timely objection, Mr. Agafonov only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at
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which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).

The State cannot

show the error was harmless in this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Agafonov respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED t~1is 9th day of April, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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